Greater control over complex weapons systems, and the elements which comprise them, such as networks of manned and unmanned vehicles, including intelligent sensors and weapons, requires special attention to systems integration issues. This includes software safety and other technical challenges and risks, such as schedule and costs associated with acquisition and total ownership. How to carry out such programs and retain the requisite level of control, is a special and somewhat new problem. Similar issues exist for the U.S. and the Australian military. These issues, and how they are integral to the whole realm of Systems Engineering are discussed, with examples from specific complex weapons programs such as the U.S Army's Future Combat System. The top five perceived risks, and how software safety plays a significant role in these risks, for Systems of Systems in general are discussed, Potential Systems Engineering approaches and processes which can be applied toward reducing these risks are described.
I. Introduction
In the post World War II (WW II) era, a new class of engineering problems arose, that of integrating multiple, usually separately developed, components into a cohesive whole to achieve a desired aggregate or 'system' behaviour. Unfortunately these 'systems' also exhibited new challenges to achieving safe systems. Among these were (Ref. Many of the safety issues facing software practitioners during the 70's and 80's reflected the early challenges of systems engineers during the post WW II era of the 50's and 60's. As a consequence of this growth it also became clear during the 70's that applying classical statistical reliability methods of safety assurance to complex software was not credible (Ref. 2) . It was then also generally believed that, because of this, confidence measures separate from reliability testing would be required to establish the safety of such software (Ref. 3) .
In more recent times, the problem has become one of integrating multiple, usually separately developed, systems, not just components, into a "cohesive whole to achieve a desired aggregate or 'system' behaviour". Thus, while safety is still a primary concern, the above challenges have manifested themselves in even more confounding manners that affect virtually all operating characteristics, not just safety. The time it takes to be in a position to strike time-critical targets is an example of the way other operating characteristics can be affected. United States Department of Defense (DOD) studies have highlighted a number of reasons for why this is the case. As with the components of post WW II systems, one of the primary reasons is that often the systems involved in the sensor-to-shooter process do not operate effectively together.
There may be more than 100 separate command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that need to work together to identify and strike specific targets. These component systems may be owned and operated by any or all of the military services, as well as other DOD and intelligence agencies, and in some cases, civilian agencies. In the future, it is possible that commercially owned components, such as the Internet or other non-government organisations may also comprise elements of such "Systems of Systems". Currently, such systems of systems have limited ability to operate together, both technically (e.g. because of incompatible data formats) as well as operationally (e.g. due to lack of a direct interface). Because most of today's Systems of Systems cannot easily and quickly exchange data, interfaces must be patched together. Because the communications between these systems is usually software intensive, safety may become a significant risk, in a variety of forms. In addition, each service (and country, in Joint Operations) may have its own command, control, and communications (C 3 ) structure presenting unique barriers to interoperability. In fact, in a battle situation, the Joint Forces Commander is faced with integrating, typically in an ad hoc manner, more than 400 different mission and software applications. The table below (Ref. 5) illustrates some of the significant differences between the current and future system of systems characteristics: Whilst in recent years programs in both the US and Australia have been instituted to address these problems by designing common, integrated systems of systems, as might be expected, the problems, and risks, increase significantly for such programs.
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II.
Systems of Systems
Independent systems which have the ability to provide and accept information from other systems are called interoperable. However, integrated systems extend beyond mere interoperability to form a network of interdependent systems which are expected to provide increased capabilities over disparate independent systems that are also capable of exchanging information. When such systems are integrated to an extent beyond mere interoperability to form a network of interdependent systems, a "System of Systems" is formed.
The components of such a system of systems are able to function and operate on an individual basis, but also on a complex integrated basis. The internet is an example: Your desktop computer can be used for word processing, as a stand-alone system, but you can then "paste" the document so produced into an electronic mail (e-mail) application and send it around the world. If you have a wireless (e.g. Bluetooth) laptop computer, you can do the same thing using satellite or ground based server networks. Such integrated systems of systems are expected to provide increased military capabilities greater than those of disparate independent systems that are capable of exchanging only limited information.
According to Ref. 6 , a System of Systems has all or a majority of the following characteristics:
• Operational Independence of the individual systems.
• Managerial independence of the systems.
• Geographic distribution.
• Emergent behaviour.
• Evolutionary development. The architecture for these Systems of Systems must have some specific features, if they are to be useful and effective. These features, as illustrated in Fig. 2 In addition, these systems of systems must be pragmatically useful and capable of continuation, and be safe and affordable both in terms of acquisition costs and total cost of ownership. Underlying all of these features is a viable and safety oriented communications substrate.
However, Systems of Systems architecture with regard to safety is frequently not even a consideration in original designs and standards. Perhaps the most pertinent architecture question related to safety is: How can we devise the simplest software (or safety critical component/system) and what is the associated level of assurance needed to prove its safety?
Remarkably of all the current software safety standards only the Australian Defence standard, DEF (AUST) 5679 (Ref. 7) , explicitly addresses simplicity as a governing technical principal of safety software design: "The design should be as simple as possible so as to make it easy to understand and to reduce the effort involved in assuring system safety. Software should also be kept simple, avoiding unnecessary or exotic features of any programming language, or the underlying hardware."
In contrast, other standards, such as ARP 4754 and DO-178B (Ref. 8 & Ref. 9 , respectively) only briefly discuss the use of simplicity to reduce assurance activities, and only in the context of system level architecture. Neither standard defines methods to measure and trade-off simplicity as a design goal against the need for assurance activities, and neither identifies simplicity as a required aspect of the certification basis.
Clearly, software is a major contributor to the significant risks associated with Systems of Systems, and the software process for Systems of Systems itself needs an architectural structure which includes standards and policies, systems engineering and risk reduction, as illustrated in Fig. 3 .
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III.
Top Five Risks
In an Australian study of Defence processes, the Kinnaird Report (Ref. 10) found that "no major project, whether it is undertaken within the private or the public sector, can be risk free". The report went on to say: "this does not mean the Government, or Defence, should accept that failure is inevitable". Kinnaird found that greater certainty of costs and risk is achievable, and that a more "businesslike approach" to managing projects can be implemented. A professional team of project managers, backed by credible and effective processes and systems, can be developed. The report further states: "Reducing the possibility of failure will require a mix of actions that impact on all stages of the capability development cycle".
A system of systems will encounter the typical risks associated with any individual complex system, comprised of various components. However, because of the increased complexity, these will be exacerbated. Independent audits, risk assessments, and systems engineering experience point to five risks as being at the top of the list for such systems of systems. For each of these, software safety should be considered as a major contributing "sub-risk", underlying the foundational substrate architecture. The risks are:
Total Cost of Ownership They are discussed separately in the following paragraphs.
A. Integration
Particularly for military systems, integration problems arise because of their complexity. Software, which has come to be the modern risk Goliath, needing to be "killed" on each program, typically requires even more substantial development to provide system level functionality; and the uncertainty associated with melding discrete systems which are rarely designed ab initio to interface with each other and which sometimes are themselves still under development when the secondary integration commences. 
Architecture Scheme for Systems of Systems Software Safety
Interoperability is essentially the ability of independent systems to provide, accept and utilise information from other systems. A prime example of a System of Systems currently being developed to provide such interoperability is the U.S. Army's Future Combat System [FCS] . This is the Army's flagship transformation program. It is a networked "system of systems" that uses advanced communications and technologies to integrate the soldier with "families" of manned and unmanned platforms and sensors. These systems will provide the capability to attack critical targets much deeper in the battle area before they become a direct threat. There are 18 core systems involved, with 157 complementary systems, 53 technologies, 34 million lines of software code and a new network (Ref. 11) .
The ability to interface with other military services, governmental agencies and multi-national partners has been built into the FCS network from the ground up, making the system more relevant to regional combatant commanders. Fig. 4 below illustrates how complex such interoperability requirements can make the system of systems integration.
The FCS, to achieve its desired capabilities, must not only execute each separate program successfully, but because the programs are interdependent, they must also be closely synchronized. In particular, the successful fielding of FCS capabilities is critically dependent on the outcome of such integral systems as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) programs. If these do not work as intended, there will not be sufficient battlefield information for the future force to operate effectively (Ref. 5).
It is not just the FCS which is faced with interoperability challenges. The US DOD's Director for Interoperability estimates that there are $36 billion worth of systems the services plan to buy that can not operate effectively together.
B. Acquisition Costs
A representation of how integration costs escalate with the number of systems is shown in Fig. 5 . As the figure indicates, the integration costs are more than just a simple addition of the costs to integrate three separate systems. The US GAO was asked to assess the FCS program's technical and managerial challenges and the prospects for delivering the FCS within cost and schedule objectives; as well as the best options for proceeding (Ref. 5). They concluded that the consequences of even modest cost increases and schedule delays would be dramatic. For example, a one-year delay late in FCS development, not an uncommon occurrence for other DOD programs, could cost over $3 billion. The GAO concluded that given the size of the program, the financial consequences of following historical patterns of cost and schedule growth could be dire. The size of the program is obviously a direct result of the number and complexity of systems which comprise the FCS.
In 2004, Army officials announced plans to accelerate the delivery of selected future combat systems to the current force. All the changes increased the total cost by $20-$25 billion, about 25% higher than the original estimate of $92 billion. A significant increase to the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase funding of $14.78 billion was required to accomplish the changes.
C. Reliability
To determine the development risks associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, JTRS Cluster 5, and WIN-T programs of the FCS, GAO obtained briefings on acquisition plans, analyzed documents describing the maturity of critical technologies, and interviewed project and product officials from the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) (Ref. 5).
They found that the program had not been able to develop radios that met size, weight, and power requirements, and the projected transmission range was only 3 kilometers-well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking Waveform. As a consequence, more unmanned aerial vehicles were expected to be needed to relay information (i.e. the number of systems within the system of systems increased -see Eq. (3), below). Intended ground vehicle users had accepted a deviation in the design-to have some of the radio's hardware mounted separately outside the vehicle-with the expectation that the contractor would develop a "better solution" later on. However, deviations were not accepted for the helicopters because it would have necessitated major design changes to the aircraft and adversely have affected the aircraft modernization schedules. Integration Cost Risk Representation. .
As any good system engineer knows, unlike ground vehicles, aviation platforms are limited in their ability to compromise on size, weight, and power issues. The Cluster 1 radio's size, weight, and peak power consumption exceeded helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 per cent. To meet the JTRS size, weight, and power requirements and realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, significant technology advances in power amplification and cooling were believed to be essential. The Army initiated science and technology development efforts to address these issues, but it was understood that significantly more time to evolve the technologies to an acceptable level of maturity would be needed. Needless to say, such problems, particularly those involving increased power consumption and inadequate cooling of electronic components, impact reliability.
In particular, as the USAF handbook on reliability points out (Ref. 12), the reliability of a system of components is directly proportional to both the quality and the quantity of the "ith" generic part type, and the sum of the different generic part types:
Total Equipment Failure Rate (failures/10 6 hrs) = ) (
Where N j is the quantity of the "ith" generic part, is the generic failure rate for the ith generic part type (failures/10 6 hrs ), is the quality factor for the ith generic part type, and n is the number of different generic part types.
Equation (1) is for a single piece of equipment with multiple parts or components. For a system with multiple components, the system failure rate is the sum of the sums, i.e. where m is the total number of components in the system. Then for a system of systems it is easy to see that the total failure rate will be: Total System of Systems Failure Rate (failures/10 6 hrs) =
Where p is the total number of systems.
The failure rate for systems of systems is also dependent upon transmission and reception characteristics of the intra system communications. Chen, et al (Ref. 13 ) have examined the performance characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks. When the failure rate is normalised by the hop to hop transmission delay between nodes, the trend is for increasing failures as a function of increasing response time in communicating with the network "leader", as illustrated in Fig. 6 , below: Note that this is a slightly different meaning of "failure" than in Eq.'s 1-3, above. That is, it is a failure of the communications link, for instance as a node moves out of range, not necessarily a parts failure (some have termed this a dependability issue rather than reliability, per se).
In the work of Ref. 13 , it was assumed that each mobile host had its own distinct mobility rate in and out of geographical communities (groups) of interest. For example, air vehicles move faster than ground vehicles which in turn move faster than human beings (in general) (Refer to Fig. 4 above) . They also assumed that the terrain was (virtually) partitioned into equal-area regions (e.g., hexagons, as shown in the figure)
For lower frequency detection activities (i.e. larger detection period, T), as the response time spent by the lead node to do membership maintenance increases, the number of node failures per communication delay (per hop) increases dramatically. This can be interpreted to mean that for a system of systems, for the type of location-based consistency algorithm assumed in Ref. 13 , as one system experiences a failure, the longer it takes for maintenance response to that failure, the more likely that another failure will occur.
Chen et al also determined that the rate of node failure events is directly proportional to the number of member nodes in the location-based group i.e. the number of systems in the system of systems -refer to Eq. (3).
An example of how serious such node failure events can be is provided in the Joint Software System Safety Handbook (Ref. 14), as follows: A battle command center, with a network controlling several missile batteries, issued an order to reposition an active missile battery. This missile battery subsequently disconnected from the network, broke-down their equipment and repositioned to a new location in the grid and commenced setting up. A final step was re-connecting the battery back into the network. The battery personnel were still occupying the erector/launcher when the connection that attached the battery into the network, was made elsewhere on the site. This immediately allowed communication between the battery and the battle command center. The battle command center, meanwhile, had prosecuted an incoming "hostile" and designated the battery to "fire," but targeted to use the old location of the battery. As the battery was off-line, the message was buffered. Once the battery crew connected the cabling, the battle command center computer sent the last valid commands from the buffer; and the command was immediately executed. "Personnel on the erector/launcher were thrown clear as the erector/launcher activated on the old slew and acquire command. Personnel injury was slight, as no one was pinned or impaled when the erector/launcher slewed" (although they could have been). Response Time required to achieve data consistency whenever there is a state change detected by any member within a geographical area of interest. 
D. Testing
Because a system of systems may be comprised of systems of various age and complexity, as well as different philosophies of operation, testing the various pieces working together may be extremely difficult. For example, one robotic system of systems being developed at the US Air Force Applied Research Laboratory (USAF ARL) will need to interact with other air vehicles, both manned and unmanned in order to, among other things, see and avoid possible air collisions. Safety software is thus a major consideration. The control system will also need to be able to compensate for system failures; and react to other unplanned events. Developing such state-of-the art control systems is a challenge, but validating and verifying their proper performance in every conceivable situation is more difficult still, if not impossible (Ref. 15) .
In some systems for example, safety is typically described in terms of risk, which is expressed in terms of hazard probability and hazard severity. Inherent in assessing the residual risk associated with such a system's software, for instance as related to safety, is an evaluation of the probability of a software hazardous state occurring. In principle, software could be tested for long enough to determine the probability of such a hazard, due to any fault, to a required level of confidence (Ref. 1) . Similarly, in principle, a system of systems could be tested long enough to determine the probability of any kind of failure, to a required level of confidence.
In practice, as with software, for systems of systems these data are impossible to obtain by empirical means prior to delivery of the entire system.
In fact, it has been estimated that performance evaluation consumes over half of the time and money associated with control systems development efforts. Even so, the only true test will come in integrated operation with all of the other systems it is supposed to interact with, including all those "unplanned" interactions.
In an Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report on Defence Test & Evaluation (T&E) practices, it was found that whilst policy aims to promote a unified approach to T&E to guarantee effective and efficient use of all T&E resources and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and resources, in practice there was little evidence of effective corporate initiatives to promote that approach (Ref. 16). As in the US, the individual Defence groups formulated their own individual policies, practices and personnel training.
Based on results for spiral development programs (Ref. 17) , some fundamental approaches to testing of systems of systems can be formulated:
• Experiments and prototyping can be used to provide immediate (but limited) operational capabilities with little or no testing -Safety, Security & Reliability issues/risks • Formal testing (verification, validation, certification, accreditation, etc) must become part of the life cycle for Systems of Systems • New user combinations can be grouped into major block upgrades or releases to efficiently test and field them • Users must accept risks in order to introduce new systems into their operational environment. The risks inherent in such approaches are manifold. However, it is virtually certain that only through fielding the entire set of systems which comprises a system of systems can it be successfully tested! Managing these risks provides a challenge for the systems and test engineers, as well as the Program Manager. Some guidelines for this risk management are:
• Operational capabilities relying on experiments and prototyping become the "test": -Safety, Security & Reliability risks must be well-understood -"Cut-outs" to enable operation without the part being tested, must be available • Continuous formal testing (verification, validation, certification, accreditation, etc) must be factored into schedule and cost estimates/budgets of the life cycle. When new user combinations are grouped into major block upgrades or releases to test and field them, all users must be made aware of, and be willing to accept the inherent risks, particularly when these new systems are being concurrently introduced into their operational environment.
As systems' capabilities mature the operational envelope of the System of Systems can be expanded. This expanding "operational envelope" may be the only way to safely and methodically test all of the integrated, interoperable systems of a system of systems.
E. Total Cost of Ownership
Total cost of ownership was discussed in an earlier paper (Ref. 18) As discussed in that paper, for major systems, Operations and Support/Sustainment (O&S) costs amount to from 40% to 80% or more of the total cost of ownership (see Fig. 7 below) . As shown, O&S costs are predominant, yet though they occur so relatively late in a product's life, they are effectively locked in early in a system's life, during design and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). For a System of Systems, the "lock-in" date is effectively the end of RDT&E for the earliest system fielded.
Thus, concerns must be addressed early in the acquisition program, and risks must be identified early. The figure below illustrates this point. Where multiple systems are concerned, foreknowledge of exactly which systems are to become part of the overall system of systems is paramount. Unfortunately, the current acquisition budgeting process does not adequately provide for the needs of such a procedure, as indicated in the Fig. 9 , below (Ref. 19):
Operations
In particular, for systems of systems, plans to integrate and test future systems need to be incorporated into the budget appropriations for the "Force After Next". To overcome some of these cost of ownership deficiencies, specific Systems Engineering processes which can be applied at appropriate phases of acquisition (particularly in early stages of formulation) to ensure progress toward achieving reduced Total Cost of Ownership are in early stages of formulation. These include:
• Life Cycle Cost discriminator identification at the concept definition stage • Life Cycle Cost recording in a defined format for cost methodology development • Establishing "Systemographic" data for predictive use (the characteristics of a system or part of it, especially its size, growth, density, distribution, and statistics regarding concept formulation, development, operation, sustainment, and disposal schedules and costs).
IV.
Systems Engineering Role
The name says it all! The role of Systems Engineering in Systems of Systems is clearly an important one, which has been recognised at the highest levels. The following extract from Ref. 20 shows the US DoD's policy on systems engineering in major projects:
"The Program Manager shall ensure that a systems engineering process is used to translate operational needs and/or requirements into a system solution that includes the design, manufacturing, test and evaluation, and support processes and products. The systems engineering process shall establish a proper balance between performance, risk, cost, and schedule, employing a top-down iterative process of requirements analysis, functional analysis and allocation, design synthesis and verification, and system analysis and control".
What are the implications for a Systems engineer in a System of Systems Environment? Paraphrasing Krebs (Ref. 21): In a System of Systems environment, nice, tidy requirements will not be handed to you with a red bow on top. It is almost certain that:
• The job hasn't been done before • Test measurements will push the edge of what is possible • Technology readiness of some elements will not be mature If a similar test or measurement has been done before, any new implementation or extension of the knowledge obtained will be as challenging as the first time: figuring out what knowledge is transferable and innovating for the rest will be the norm Nevertheless, a sound Systems Engineering approach is fundamental to reducing risks of the type described in this paper. An independent review of Australian Systems Engineering practices (Ref. 22) found that in Defence, systems engineering places a strong emphasis on risk management, and also on the activities which if not performed, or if performed poorly, lead to the greatest risks in projects. The report states that these activities include:
• Capturing and thoroughly analysing the stakeholders' needs and expectations;
• Considering the full materiel life cycle in technical decisions;
• Considering the system's environment and interfaces with other systems;
• Providing visibility and control in the project, so that the proposed capability is known and progress towards that capability can be measured at all stages; • Ensuring that alternative solutions at all levels are both proposed and assessed; • Providing traceability links between all project products, including interim products, and the stakeholders' needs; and • Ensuring that all decisions and their justifications are recorded It was estimated that on average for Australian Defence Acquisition Organisation (DAO, now part of the Defence Materiel Organisation, DMO) projects, the following benefits could be realised from consistent and competent application of systems engineering:
• 10% or more reduction in the cost of delivery to Defence (i.e. the costs excluding the actual contractual price); • At least 10% reduction in the duration of the pre-contract period of the acquisition phase of projects; and • 5% or more reduction in the contract price (including variations and changes) This last benefit was anticipated to improve as more suppliers are encouraged to adopt systems engineering approaches. The benefits were also expected to be much higher in more complex projects requiring significant development. For large software intensive systems (e.g. FCS), for example, it was estimated that the benefits would include:
• At least 30% reduction in the cost of delivery;
• At least 20% reduction in the duration of the pre-contract period; and • At least 30% reduction in the contract price (including variations and changes).
Considering that cost risks are two of the major risk areas identified earlier, such potential reductions could be even more significant for systems of systems.
V.
Conclusions & Recommendations
Systems of Systems face extreme risks, particularly in the area of systems/software safety, primarily because of their disparate engineering and working characteristics, but also because of their unusually large geographic coverage. The technical risks necessarily translate into major schedule and cost risks, both during acquisition and operations and sustainment. Understanding these risks at early stages of a System of Systems program, and applying sound systems engineering principles during the program's life enables risk mitigation to be achieved.
• Recommendations Based on some of the recommendations the US GAO has made for specific System of Systems developments (Ref. 23 & Ref. 24) , certain approaches can be used to accomplish risk mitigation. These include:
• Establishing low-risk schedules for demonstrating the separate systems and their interfaces • Synchronizing the overall System of Systems development schedule with the schedules for the major subsystems • Developing an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an evaluation of network maturity as part of production decisions.
